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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the debate on the ubiquity of fictional narrators – whether every fictional 
narrative has a fictional narrator – has spread from film to literature. George Wilson 
reacted to Noël Carroll’s and Andrew Kania’s claims that no fictional narrators but 
explicit ones such as Ishmael from Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick exist.1  Wilson took 
a near-ubiquity position claiming that almost every fictional novel, except those 
consisting exclusively of dialogue, has at least a minimal narrating agency or a 
fictional narrator. Yet, he disassociated himself from the usual ontological-gap 
argument made to support such claims. In other words, he denied the main tenet of an 
argument made by Jerrold Levinson; the claim that only fictional entities are able of 
presenting fictional events to the reader or viewer.2   
In the first section of this paper I will present Wilson’s near-ubiquity theory and 
argue against it on the basis of its inconsistencies in the treatment of the text. In the 
second section I will draw attention to deficiencies in Levinson’s argument but will 
put forward a novel version of the ontological-gap argument for near-ubiquity in 
literary fiction – the linguistic version. The near-ubiquity argued for will in scope be 
the same as Wilson’s but instead of actual authors as narrators it will posit implicit 
fictional narrators. In the last section I will argue Wilson’s ubiquity theory for fiction 
film completely lacks any textual grounding. I will conclude that nothing akin to the 
                                                 
1
     The texts include Wilson (2007), Carrroll (2006) and Kania (2005) 
2
     Levinson (1996). 
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linguistic version of the ontological-gap argument is applicable to film and that 
although there is a possibility for implicit fictional narrators almost none of the 
existing movies have implemented it. Therefore there exists an asymmetry between 
film and literature with regard to the presence of implicit fictional narrators. 
 
II.  WILSON’S NEAR-UBIQUITY THEORY FOR LITERARY FICTION 
Wilson recently claimed that Jerrold Levinson’s ontological-gap argument for the 
existence of the implicit fictional narrator is inconclusive because it hinges upon a 
choice of preferred phenomenological accounts of our imaginative engagement with 
fictional texts.3 According to Wilson, Levinson’s preferred phenomenological 
description is that no actual author ever fictionally narrates and that this is the 
exclusive domain of the fictional narrator. The actual author produces fictional texts 
(literary or filmic ones) from which fictional stories fictionally told as actual by 
fictional narrators can be reconstructed through imaginative engagement.4 According 
to Wilson, by contrast, the reader of a fictional novel engages the book in a game of 
make-believe in which, if there is no explicit fictional narrator and if there are at least 
some non-dialogue passages, the book’s real author fictionally recounts the depicted 
events as actual.5 In the case of fiction films the viewer imagines she is being 
fictionally shown ‘motion-picture-like shots’ derived in a fictionally indeterminate 
manner from the fictional world.6 Thus, Wilson argues for near-ubiquity in literary 
fiction and ubiquity in film.  
Wilson is puzzled as to what could count as undeniable evidence for either of the 
phenomenological descriptions. Yet this confusion is merely a consequence of his 
inconsistent understanding of the object of imaginative engagement. Only once this 
object is consistently identified as the text, understood in Seymour Chatman’s sense 
of any type of “communication that temporally controls its reception by the 
audience”,7 and clearly delimited from the author-text complex, can we make some 
headway in providing the evidence Wilson talks about. As I will argue, if we keep this 
understanding of text firmly in place, we can establish that there is prima facie 
evidence for the existence of controlling fictional narrators in most, though not all, 
                                                 
3
  Wilson (2007). 
4
  Levinson (1996). 
5
  Wilson (2007). 
6
  Wilson (1997). 
7
  Chatman (1990), p.8. 
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novelistic texts and that there is no evidence for such narrators in most, though not all 
filmic texts.8  
The crucial mistake Wilson makes is to model the phenomenological description of 
narration in transparent novelistic narratives such as Graham Greene’s The Heart of 
the Matter on a description of oral narration. Wilson describes a father telling his 
child a made-up bedtime story as a case of oral narration in which the father and the 
child play a game of make-believe in which the father fictionally reports fictional 
events as actual. Yet Kania provides an equally legitimate but incompatible 
description of this act. For Kania, the father is simply narrating the events as fictional 
without fictionally narrating them in the strict sense.9 The reason why there are two 
legitimate phenomenological accounts is that there are two legitimate understandings 
of the text of oral narration, both in line with Chatman’s understanding. 
Wilson understands oral narration much like a fictional monodrama with the oral 
narrator as its sole character. Her whole performance is seen as fictional and she is but 
a fictional character in a play staged for the child. Kania, in contrast, sees no relevant 
difference between the bedtime story transcribed and Greene’s novel. The text for 
him is merely what is said as fiction by the father and not the actual act of narrating as 
well. When Wilson models his understanding of written narration on his 
understanding of the bedtime story he misses Kania’s remark that similarity holds 
between the novel and the transcribed story and not between the novel and the act of 
oral narration. This leads Wilson to claim that “Greene fictionally recounts as actual 
the depicted events of The Heart of the Matter”.10 But, if the text in the case of 
Greene’s novel is nothing but the novel itself, and this is indeed the only correct 
understanding of the text in this case, then Wilson cannot legitimately claim that the 
actual author fictionally recounts the events in the novel. 
 
III.  LINGUISTIC VERSION OF THE ONTOLOGICAL-GAP ARGUMENT 
This point is reaffirmed if we consider the significance of a particular class of words –
deictics – for the parallel line of inquiry in the existence of controlling narrators. The 
                                                 
8
  Controlling narrators are understood in Gregory Currie’s (1995) sense as narrators whose narrating 
coincides with the whole of the text and not merely a part of it: pp.265-270. The implicit, and not the 
explicit ones, are in question. 
9
  Kania (2005), p.50. 
10
  Wilson (2007), p.79. Not to complicate things further I assume Wilson means the implied author 
and not the actual author when he talks about Graham Greene. In any case, his possible imprecision is 
orthogonal to my argument. 
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question has been whether there are fictional assertions being made in the text, which 
would imply that there is a controlling narrator doing the asserting, or whether merely 
propositional content is being expressed which would imply nothing of the sort. In the 
case of literary texts Wilson has argued for the former, whereas Carroll and Kania 
have claimed the latter.11 Although undecided, the argument tilts in Wilson’s favor. 
As it stands now, the argument establishes a crucial qualitative property of the 
controlling narrator, namely its epistemological access to the fictional world, as a 
property not exclusive to fictional characters or narrators.12 Kania and Wilson, in their 
criticism of Levinson’s epistemological version of the ontological-gap argument, have 
clearly demonstrated that Greene can be in command of all the necessary facts of the 
fictional world as much as any fictional character or narrator can.13 Thus, Wilson has 
another way for saying Greene indeed fictionally narrates his novel.  
My addition to the debate is an argument of the following form: if fictional 
assertions are being made in the narrative text, then another set of properties 
pertaining to the controlling narrator of that text and exclusive to fictional entities 
becomes readily available. Moreover, if a controlling narrator possesses two 
properties, one of which can belong to both actual and fictional entities and the other 
exclusively to fictional ones, then the controlling narrator is fictional. I call this the 
linguistic version of the ontological-gap argument. It rests, as I explain below, on 
deictic properties of particular classes of words.  
According to Gérard Genette, an inadequate understanding of deictics – words 
such as ‘here’, ‘now’ and ‘I’ – explains the frequent confusion of actual authors with 
fictional narrators in discussions of the classical novel. As Émile Benveniste 
demonstrated, these words acquire meaning in non-fictional narratives only in 
connection with the present instance of discourse which produced them.14 As such 
they are markers of subjectivity in language use whose reference cannot be 
determined without recourse to the (spatio-temporal) position of the agent who uttered 
them. Thus, ‘I’ is “the individual who utters the present instance of discourse 
containing the linguistic instance I”; ‘here’ and ‘now’ “delimit the spatial and 
                                                 
11
  The texts include Wilson (2007), Carrroll (2006, 2008) and Kania (2005). 
12
   I use ‘it’ for the narrator because it is clear it need not be human or sexed.  
13
  See Kania (2005) and Wilson (2007). Indeed, Currie (1995) gives an account of how the implied 
author alone, without any recourse to the implicit fictional narrator, is sufficient for analysis of 
unreliable narratives: pp.270-282.  
14
  Benveniste (1971). 
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temporal instance coextensive and contemporary with the present instance of 
discourse containing I”.15 
I take my cue for the linguistic version of the ontological-gap argument from 
Genette, for whom deictics within the fictional text do not refer to authorial time-
space of writing but to discursive time-space of narration.16 Of course, fictional 
literary narrative texts need not include any of the standard deictics noted above but 
they will invariably include at least one verb and that verb will be tensed. The tense of 
the verb is itself a deictic property because no matter how a particular language’s 
tense system is organized the line of separation between the tenses is always a 
reference to the ‘present’.17 And ‘present’ is nothing but “the coincidence of the event 
described with the instance of discourse that describes it”.18 In other words, the 
present of a given event, “the time at which one is” is nothing but “the time at which 
one is speaking”.19 Deictic properties then not only highlight the existence of the 
discourse producing agent, as they necessarily entail a speaking I, but also provide 
temporal information about her. 
Consider the sentence from Greene’s The Heart of the Matter both Kania and 
Wilson quote as an example of self-effaced narrative: “Wilson sat on the balcony of 
the Bedford Hotel with his bald pink knees thrust against the ironwork.” Contrary to 
what Kania and Wilson think, this supposedly transparent sentence does provide 
temporal information about the narrator responsible for the sentence. By virtues of its 
deictic properties the word ‘sat’ implies that the fictional event preceded its narrative 
description. The question is: can an actual author have a temporal position with regard 
to a fictional event? I see no way how she can and am thus obliged to posit an agent 
within the fictional world making this fictional assertion.20 Moreover, none of the 
fictional characters in the novel are making this assertion and thus the agent can be 
none other than the controlling fictional narrator. Finally, so as not to unnecessarily 
multiply various narrating agents, this controlling fictional narrator, inhabiting a 
                                                 
15
  Ibid, pp.218-19. 
16
  Genette (1980), p.214. 
17
  Benveniste (1971), pp.226-27. 
18
  Ibid, p.227. 
19
  Ibid, p.227. 
20
  In a footnote, with only a cursory remark about his skepticism towards counterpart theory in fiction, 
Wilson dismisses the possibility that Richard Nixon from Rober Coover’s The Public Burning is a 
fictional character based on the actual one (2007), fn.9. I find this remark insufficient to disqualify 
Lubomir Doležel’s postulate of ontological homogeneity of fictional worlds (1998) or to resolve 
problems stemming from the “mixed-bag” conception of actual people inhabiting fictional worlds 
pointed out by D. E. B. Pollard (1973), p.61 and Jerzy Pelc (1977), p.266.  
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particular fictional temporal position is the very same one who has a particular 
epistemological access to the fictional world. Of course, there are novels, such as 
Charlotte Brontë’s, which consist exclusively of direct speech. Because deictic 
properties of words found in those utterances refer exclusively to fictional characters 
uttering them I see no reason to posit a controlling fictional narrator for this class of 
narrative texts. 
I believe it is possible to construct an even stronger version of my argument. As 
noted earlier, Carroll and Kania could claim that the sentence quoted above is not a 
fictional assertion but merely a container of propositional content. Yet, propositional 
content in analytic philosophy is usually discussed in the form “X does Y” or “X is 
Y”. The present simple in these sentences is not used for an action occurring at the 
moment of speaking but for expressing a fact, a state of affairs or a generalization. 
These sentences are easily understood without any recourse to temporality. Literary 
narratives on the other hand, regularly employ verb tenses to express the time, 
however imprecisely, of a particular event. Thus, and this is the crucial moment in the 
stronger version of my argument, we cannot simply translate past simple sentences of 
the type quoted above into propositional content of the form “at one point in time X 
does/is Y” without losing relevant information. The propositional content must keep a 
reference to past tense. But then, how can we fully understand fictional propositional 
content P such as “X was Y” without recourse to a ‘present’ temporal position at 
which X might no longer be Y? This ‘present’ temporal position, as Benveniste 
elaborates, can be understood only as the moment of speaking about the event 
contained in P. Speaking necessarily entails a speaker, and the weaker linguistic 
version of the ontological-gap argument establishes that the speaker of a fictional 
event contained in P is fictional. Thus, to imagine literary narrative sentences to 
merely contain propositional content, if the chain of reasoning is followed through, 
establishes a controlling fictional narrator no different than the one established by 
imagining sentences as fictional assertions. 
I assume this stronger version of the argument could be warded off with an appeal 
to indeterminacy of a sort. However, Berys Gaut has rightfully identified that 
indeterminacy is invoked only to resolve paradoxical situations or to suspend the 
chain of reasoning by implication.21 There is nothing paradoxical in any of the 
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  Gaut (2004). For a list of paradoxical situations see Wilson (1997), p.193. 
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versions of my argument so no appeal to anything of the sort of the ‘basic prescription 
of stipulated omniscience’ Wilson proposes in order to ward off Carroll’s and Gaut’s 
criticism of the supposed paradox of omniscient narrator is needed.22 On the other 
hand, in the stronger version of the argument, the chain of reasoning indeed might be 
too long. It could be said that the reader imagines a ‘present’ temporal position and 
that she imagines it to be fictional but, not being familiar with Benveniste’s work, she 
needn’t posses a fully developed concept of what ‘present’ exactly means. Thus she 
postulates no fictional narrator. But note that if such an argument were to be made, it 
would have to be made by those who oppose indeterminate explanations (e.g. Carrol 
and Gaut). Furthermore, in the weaker version of the argument, it is assumed fictional 
assertions are being made. What remains is to settle questions of fictional asserter’s 
temporal and epistemic position to its assertions. The latter question, despite it being 
no less complex than the former, is regularly tackled so any claim to indeterminacy in 
resolving matters of time but not epistemology as well would be illegitimate.  
 
IV.  AGAINST UBIQUITY IN FICTION FILM  
Let us finally turn to film. Note that in the case of literature I agree with Wilson that 
there is a controlling fictional narrator although I base my claim on different grounds. 
Whereas he shifts in the understanding of the text and puts forward phenomenological 
arguments, I am consistent in the understanding of the text and insist on existential-
qualitative information derived from deictic properties found solely within the text. 
Moreover, Wilson is sometimes ready to identify the actual author with the fictional 
narrator whereas I am not. Interestingly, Wilson’s analysis of filmic texts is not 
compromised by the shift that undermines his analysis of literary texts. This suggests 
that he consistently understands filmic texts in Chatman’s sense. Yet, his overall 
argumentative strategy in regard to film differs from the one employed in the 
discussion of literary texts. In the case of film he criticizes the earlier face-to-face 
version of the fictional showing hypothesis (FSH henceforth), advocated by Chatman 
and Levinson, for confusing showing the fictional with fictional showing. He invokes 
the example of a shadow play to demonstrate how a fictional story of a hawk 
attacking a mole can be told in shadows by an actual person using her hands without 
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  Criticisms can be found in Carroll (2006) and Gaut (2004). 
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there being any fictional showing from within the fictional world.23 Indeed, it is 
sufficient to actually present a series of images in which it is fictional that the 
envisaged events take place in order to show those events as fictional. Wilson’s next 
step is to construct a more complex variant of the FSH in order to establish a way in 
which a viewer could coherently imagine a fictional film as being fictionally narrated. 
The mediated FSH states that fictional showing in filmic texts boils down to “the 
fictional exhibition and sequential arrangement, by means of editing, of motion 
picture shots of the occurrences that constitute the story”.24 Here, motion picture shots 
should be understood as naturally iconic images (NIIs henceforth) which like 
photographs exhibit natural counterfactual dependence on the array of elements and 
features present in the photographed situation, but unlike them are not produced by 
the camera. Their crucial characteristic is that although they are produced from within 
the fiction, the exact manner of their production is left indeterminate in our 
imaginative engagement with them.25 In other words, Wilson holds that when 
watching a movie we regularly imagine that we are fictionally shown fictionally 
edited fictional images of fictional events by a controlling fictional narrator.  
Note two crucial steps in Wilson’s argument for the existence of the filmic 
controlling fictional narrator: 1) the images constituting the filmic text are fictional, 
and 2) there is an agent who arranges and shows them who is fictional as well. It 
seems to me that step 2 can rest solely on what I dub “the material” version of the 
ontological-gap argument. NIIs are fictionally material artifacts and these can indeed 
be handled exclusively by fictional entities. Thus, according to Wilson, it is safe to 
assume a fictional agent is doing the handling.26 This, however, is problematic. If 
Wilson goes to such pains to construct an indeterminate conception of the production 
of NIIs, wouldn’t it also make sense to claim that their arrangement and exhibition are 
indeterminate as well? Why do we have to posit a sort of a grand imager doing the 
editing if we do not have to imagine her producing the shots as well? Even if Wilson 
                                                 
23
  Here, interestingly, Wilson chooses not to understand the whole performance as fictional as he does 
in the case of the bedtime story and only focuses on the shadow. One could legitimately argue that 
shadow play is a game of make-believe in which it is fictional the person is fictionally showing the 
shadow events as actual. 
24
  Wilson (1997), p.194. 
25
  This characteristic is included in order to ward off numerous criticisms put forward by Carroll 
(2006). 
26
  Note that in his later paper about the implicit controlling fictional narrator Wilson explicitly states 
his argument for its existence does not rest on any version of the ontological-gap argument. As no 
novel argument for the narrator in the filmic text is given I assume this is still the version of the 
argument Wilson subscribes to.  
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resolved this issue, the crucial problem of the argument is step 1. There is no reason to 
suppose that what we are shown in the filmic text are NIIs to begin with. As Carroll 
argues, given the ontological and technological complexity of NIIs, it is unlikely that 
regular audiences entertain these concepts at all.27 In addition, there are no textual 
clues to engender such concepts. There is nothing in the visuals of almost any 
fictional movie that would suggest the postulation of NII.  
There are movies in which a somewhat similar effect is achieved, but what they 
imply is not NIIs but either motion picture shots through found footage device (The 
Blair Witch Project, 1999) or subjective shots of fictional characters through 
continuous insistence on the POV shot (Lady of the Lake, 1947 and Blue, 1993). Thus, 
with some modifications of the movies, such as stipulation that The Blair Witch 
Project is fictional or the elimination of the extra-diegetic music in Lady of the Lake 
and Blue, one could imagine a film with genuine controlling fictional narrators. 
Moreover, I could imagine a film, say of a bank robbery, in which all of the shots are 
identified as belonging to one of the cameras of an intelligent surveillance system. But 
all of these controlling fictional narrators would be explicit. The more general 
problem then is not what could count as conclusive evidence for claiming that we 
imagine NIIs when watching fictional films, but rather what could count as conclusive 
evidence for the existence of an implicit controlling narrator. Wilson admits none is 
likely to be found.28 Even Christian Metz, who argues that film is a language system, 
acknowledge that nothing exactly akin to deictics exists in film.29 
Human beings can imagine almost anything. They can surely imagine that it is the 
actual author who is narrating fictional events (in fact, as Genette points out, they 
often did and still do) or that the film is presented through NIIs. But it is one thing to 
imagine something at will and another to imagine something according to parameters 
set by the text. Wilson’s mediated FSH is devised to show that imaginings of NIIs are 
at least minimally coherent. The problem is he provides no textual grounding for such 
imaginings. If Wilson is ready to admit, as I am, the absence of controlling fictional 
narrators in novels containing exclusively direct speech, I fail to see why he insists on 
their existence in fiction films. Carroll’s and Currie’s suggestion that instead of seeing 
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  Carroll (2006). 
28
  Wilson (2007). 
29
  Metz (1991). In an unpublished paper Problem of Voice in Fiction Film I elaborate how various 
enunciation theorists are metaphorical at best in their claims that they have identified true visual 
analogues to deictics in filmic texts. 
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imaginarily we just see images which we use to imagine what is fictionally the case 
seems to offer a more sensible account of what we readily imagine in watching fiction 
films.30 Paisley Livingston correctly points out the burden of proof remains on the 
ubiquity theorist.31 
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